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Abstract
The success of image perturbations that are designed to
fool image classification is assessed in terms of both ad-
versarial effect and visual imperceptibility. In this work,
we investigate the contribution of human color perception
to perturbations that are not noticeable. Our basic in-
sight is that perceptual color distance makes it possible to
drop the conventional assumption that imperceptible per-
turbations should strive for small Lp norms in RGB space.
Our first approach, Perceptual Color distance C&W (PerC-
C&W), extends the widely-used C&W approach and pro-
duces larger RGB perturbations. PerC-C&W is able to
maintain adversarial strength, while contributing to imper-
ceptibility. Our second approach, Perceptual Color dis-
tance Alternating Loss (PerC-AL), achieves the same out-
come, but does so more efficiently by alternating between
the classification loss and perceptual color difference when
updating perturbations. Experimental evaluation shows
PerC approaches improve robustness and transferability
of perturbations over conventional approaches and also
demonstrates that the PerC distance can provide added
value on top of existing structure-based approaches to cre-
ating image perturbations.
1. Introduction
Research on creating adversarial examples for deep vi-
sual classifiers has focused on perturbations that cause
misclassification while being imperceptible to the human
eye [47, 41, 6]. Larger image perturbations are known
to improve adversarial strength (i.e., the ability to fool a
classifier), but are also associated with visually noticeable
changes in the image. A commonly agreed-upon assump-
tion is that tight Lp-norm constraints on the size of ad-
versarial perturbations in RGB space are a good guaran-
tee of imperceptibility. Evaluation of adversarial exam-
ples has conventionally followed this assumption, consid-
ering perturbations with smaller Lp norms to be better (e.g.,
Figure 1: Comparison of (a) C&W [6] with (b) our PerC-
C&W. Perceptual color (PerC) distance allows larger RGB
perturbations (cf. L2 and L∞ norm in middle row), while
also contributing to imperceptibility (bottom row). (Setting:
untargeted with κ = 40; classifier Inception v3.)
L∞ [17, 27, 6], L2 [47, 39, 6] and L0 [41, 6]). Keeping
with this assumption, defense approaches are designed to
be effective against adversarial perturbations under a spe-
cific Lp bound [49, 37, 52, 9]. Our research is motivated by
the importance of questioning the necessity of small RGB
perturbations for imperceptibility.
In this work, we propose to create adversarial exam-
ples by perturbing images with respect to perceptual color
(PerC) distance. Using PerC distance makes it possible
to move away from the assumption that it is necessary to
tightly constrain the Lp norm of the perturbations in RGB
space. Fig. 1 illustrates the difference between C&W [6],
a well-known approach that perturbs with respect to an
Lp norm in RGB space, and our own extension, PerC-
C&W, which perturbs with respect to a perceptual color dis-
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tance. PerC perturbations are less perceptible, especially in
smooth regions of saturated color (cf. Fig. 1 in bottom row).
Also, they are distributed strategically over the RGB color
channels (cf. downsized perturbation images in the middle
row). PerC distance effectively allows us to hide large per-
turbations in RGB space, in a way not readily noticeable to
the human eye. Our PerC-based approaches can increase
the Lp norm substantially (cf. Fig. 1, L2 and L∞ in middle
row), leading to a strong adversarial effect that maintains
imperceptibility.
Fig. 2 motivates the use of perceptual color distance for
creating adversarial images. Here, we have taken a solid
color image (left) and added the same perturbations to the
green channel (middle) and to the blue channel (right). Al-
though both RGB channels were perturbed identically, the
perturbations are only visible in the green channel. The rea-
son is that color as it is perceived by the human eye does
not change uniformly over distance in RGB space. Rela-
tively small perturbations in RGB space may correspond to
large difference in perceptual color space. Conversely, rela-
tively large changes in RGB space may remain unnoticeable
if they lead to small perceived color difference.
Our work is in line with a growing awareness in the lit-
erature on adversarial examples that the difference between
two images as measured by an Lp norm in RGB space is
actually quite poorly aligned with human perception [43].
Building on this observation, researchers have attempted
to address imperceptibility by exploiting similarity defined
with respect to semantics [14, 22, 44, 23, 15] or structural
information [35, 18, 56, 10] in the image. However, lit-
tle work on adversarial examples has questioned the wis-
dom of optimizing perturbations with respect to distance in
RGB space. The exceptions are a handful of approaches
that have proposed allowing only luminance change when
perturbing pixels [18, 10]. The approach that is closest
to our own is [2], which perturbs in CIELAB color space,
but carries out no investigation of the potential and limi-
tations of the idea. Our work is distinct from this initial
effort because we use a more accurate polar form (known
as CIELCH) of the CIELAB color space, and more impor-
tantly, use an actual perceptual color distance. The distance
is CIEDE2000 [36, 1], and will be discussed in detail in
Section 2. To our knowledge, ours is the first work that pro-
poses optimizing adversarial image perturbations directly
with respect to a perceptual color distance.
In order to fully appreciate our proposal, it is necessary
to understand two key aspects. First, we do not claim that
PerC approaches will always yield dramatically less percep-
tible perturbations than conventional RGB approaches. For
cases in which the perturbations are small, the difference
may not be so great. However, we find that there are two
cases in which PerC approaches are particularly important.
First, our experimental results (see Section 5.2.2) show that
Figure 2: Left: Original image (a 20× 20 8-bit RGB image
patch with color (15,240,15)). Middle: Image perturbed
by adding noise in the G channel, sampled from a uniform
distribution in the range [-15,15]. Right: Image perturbed
by adding the identical noise, but in the B channel. The
B-channel perturbations are imperceptible.
as we attempt to create high-confidence adversarial exam-
ples that contain larger and larger perturbations, it becomes
important to perturb with respect to perceptual color dis-
tance. Second, we demonstrate that the effect of PerC ap-
proaches is additive and can be used in combination with
existing structural approaches to improve imperceptibility.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• An in-depth study of the use of perceptual color (PerC)
distance to hide large RGB perturbations in images.
• PerC-C&W: a method for creating adversarial images
that introduces perceptual color distance into the joint
optimization of C&W.
• PerC-AL: an efficient method that optimizes alternat-
ing loss (AL) functions, switching between classifica-
tion loss and perceptual color difference.
• Experimental validation demonstrating that PerC per-
turbations at high-confidence settings yield more ro-
bust and transferable adversarial examples, without
sacrificing imperceptibility.
• Experimental results showing that PerC perturbations
can be used in combination with structural information
for further improvement of imperceptibility.
We release the code including a differentiable solution
compatible with PyTorch’s autograd to efficiently imple-
ment perceptual color distance (CIEDE2000).1
2. Background on Perceptual Color Distance
Conventionally, computer vision research has intensively
explored color and human perception, but has paid surpris-
ingly little attention to distance in perceptual color spaces.
Here, we mention some key points about color in computer
vision history. Early on, research focused on intensity-
based descriptors, which then evolved to also capture color
information. Unsurprisingly, color boosted the performance
of object and scene recognition [24, 50] and semantic seg-
mentation [7]. Researchers extracted descriptors from op-
1Code available at https://github.com/ZhengyuZhao/PerC-Adversarial.
ponent color spaces, most notably HSV and CIELAB,
which separate luminance and chrominance. Most recently,
color is attracting more attention in the area of image syn-
thesis. Notable examples, such as style transfer [16] and
cross-domain image generation [48], find that color plays
an important role in preserving the look of an image. In
general, we observe that until now the focus has been on
the color space itself, and not on color distance, which we
explore here.
The perceptual color distance that we use is
CIEDE2000 [36, 1], which is the latest ∆E standard
formula developed by the CIE (International Commission
on Illumination), and has been experimentally demon-
strated to have strong agreement with human perception.
Specifically, the perceptual color distance between two
pixels in the CIELCH space can be calculated as:
∆E00 =
√
(
∆L′
kLSL
)2 + (
∆C ′
kCSC
)2 + (
∆H ′
kHSH
)2 + ∆R,
∆R = RT (
∆C ′
kCSC
)(
∆H ′
kHSH
),
(1)
where ∆L′, ∆C ′, ∆H ′ denotes the distance between pixel
values of the three channels, L (lightness), C (chroma) and
H (hue), and ∆R is an interactive term between chroma and
hue differences [36]. The weighting functions SL, SC , SH
and RT are determined based on large-scale human studies
and act as compensations to better simulate human color
perception. The kL, kC and kH are usually unity for the
application of graphic arts. Detailed definitions of all the
parameters and relevant explanations can be found in [36].
We note that it is also possible to use anLp norm to measure
distance in CIELAB space. However, this distance is not as
close to human perceptual distance as CIEDE2000 is.
We point out that a limited amount of previous research
that has also adopted CIEDE2000. However, the goal has
been to evaluate the color similarity of image pairs. Exam-
ples of such research include work on image quality assess-
ment [55] and image super-resolution [32]. In contrast, in
our work we use CIEDE2000 directly for optimization with
back propagation and not only for evaluation.
3. Related work
In this section, we cover the existing literature, which
focuses on creating Lp norm-bounded adversarial exam-
ples, and we also mention recent approaches that attempt
to move beyond Lp norms. We preface our discussion with
a short definition of an ‘adversary’, i.e., an approach that
generates an adversarial image example. Given a classifier
f(x) : x ∈ Rn → y ∈ R that predicts a label y for an im-
age x, the adversary attempts to induce a misclassification
by modifying the original x to create a new x′. In the un-
targeted setting, the adversary is successful if the image is
classified into an arbitrary class other than y, i.e., meets the
condition f(x′) 6= y. In the targeted setting, the adversary
must ensure that the image is classified into a class with a
pre-defined label t, i.e., meets the condition f(x′) = t. The
untargeted case is generally recognized to be less challeng-
ing than the targeted case [6].
3.1. Lp norm-bounded Adversarial Examples
Typically, adversaries [47, 27, 17, 39, 41, 6, 42] create
an adversarial image, x′, by adding a perturbation vector
δ ∈ Rn that is constrained by an Lp norm to the original
image, x. The first Lp norm-bounded approach [47] op-
timized an objective combining the classification loss and
the L2 norm of the perturbations, balanced by a constant λ.
Formally, the solution is expressed as:
minimize
δ
λ‖δ‖2 − J(x′, y), s.t. x′ ∈ [0, 1]n, (2)
where J(x′, y) is the cross-entropy loss w.r.t. x′.
The authors of [47] solved the problem by using box-
constrained L-BFGS (Limited memory Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno) method [31].
The C&W method [6] improves on [47] by introducing
a new variable using the tanh function to eliminate the box
constraint. Additionally, it introduces a more sophisticated
objective function that optimizes differences between logits
Z, which are output before the softmax layer. This can be
formulated as:
minimize
w
‖x′ − x‖22 + λf(x′),
where f(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t,−κ),
and x′ =
1
2
(tanh(arctanh(x) +w) + 1),
(3)
where w is the new variable and Z(x′)i denotes the logits
with respect to the i-th class. In an untargeted setting, the
definition of f is modified to:
f(x′) = max(Z(x′)y −max{Z(x′)i : i 6= y},−κ). (4)
The parameter κ controls the confidence level of the mis-
classification. The first approach that we propose, PerC-
C&W, is built on C&W. In our experiments, we will vary κ
in order to assess the ability of an adversary to create strong
adversarial images, i.e., images that are misclassified with
high confidence.
Due to the need for line search in order to find the op-
timal constant, λ, such optimization approach is inevitably
time-consuming. For this reason, [17, 27, 42] propose a
more efficient solution that does not impose a penalty dur-
ing optimization. Instead, respect of the norm constraint
is ensured by projecting perturbations onto an -sphere
around the original image. Specifically, the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [17] was first proposed to achieve ad-
versarial effect with only one step, formulated as:
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)), (5)
where the perturbation size is implicitly constrained by
specifying a small .
Subsequently, an extension of this method referred to as
I-FGSM [27] was introduced for leveraging finer gradient
information by iteratively updating the perturbations with a
smaller step size α:
x′0 = x, x
′
k = x
′
k−1 + α · sign(∇xJ(x′k−1, y)), (6)
where the intermediate perturbed image x′k is projected
onto a -sphere around the original x, to satisfy the L∞-
norm constraint. I-FGSM can also generalize to the L2
norm by changing the sign operation to:
∇xJ(x′k−1, y)
‖∇xJ(x′k−1, y)‖2
, (7)
where the projection is implemented by:
x′k = x+ 
x′k − x
‖x′k − x‖2
. (8)
Recently, an efficient method called the Decoupled Di-
rection and Norm (DDN) [42] was proposed and yielded
the best performance (smallest L2 norm) in the untargeted
track of NIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge [4], with
substantially fewer iterations than the conventional C&W.
This method is basically L2 norm-based I-FGSM with the
 being adjusted in each iteration based on whether the per-
turbed image is adversarial or not, leading to a finer-grained
search for the minimal norm. Our second approach, PerC-
AL, follows a similar strategy as DDN to improve efficiency
by decoupling the joint optimization.
3.2. Adversarial examples beyond Lp norms
Our work is part of the current movement away from
tightLp norms and towards conceptualization of image sim-
ilarity in terms of semantics or perceptual properties. Re-
search that defines similarity in terms of semantics, requires
the adversarial image to have the same content as the orig-
inal image from the point of view of the human viewer.
Some of the first work in this direction has explored geo-
metric transformation [14, 53], global color shift [22, 29, 3],
and image filters [8].
Such approaches are interesting, but we do not pursue
them here because they tend to be limited in their adversar-
ial strength, due to the restricted size of the search space for
possible adversarial image transformations.
Research that investigates similarity with respect to tex-
ture and structure [35, 18, 56, 10], has focused on hid-
ing perturbations in image regions with visual variation.
In [35, 10], image regions with high variance are used to
hide image perturbations. In [18], additional supervision of
structural similarity (SSIM) [51] is used to guide the per-
turbation updates. Other work [56] has applied Laplacian
smoothing to obtain image structure, which is used to mod-
ify the image while maintaining the original structure. All
of these approaches share a common challenge: They have
difficulties in dealing with smooth regions (e.g., sky, ground
and artificial objects), which appear frequently in images
taken in commonly occurring real-world settings (referred
to as natural images). In contrast, our PerC perturbations
are applicable in smooth regions in the case of saturated
color. Our experiments show that it can be combined pro-
ductively with a structure-based approach.
4. Proposed approaches
In this section, we present two approaches to using per-
ceptual color (PerC) distance for adversarial image pertur-
bations. We focus on image-level accumulated perceptual
color difference, i.e., L2 norm of the color distance vector,
in which each component represents the perceptual color
distance (∆E00 in Eq. (1)) calculated for the corresponding
image pixel.
4.1. Perceptual color distance penalty (PerC-C&W)
Our first approach, PerC-C&W, adopts the joint opti-
mization framework of the well-known C&W, but replaces
the original penalty on the L2 norm with a new one based
on perceptual color difference. It can be formally expressed
as:
minimize
w
‖∆E00(x,x′)‖2 + λf(x′), (9)
where w is the new introduced variable as in the Eq. (3)
of C&W. Like the original C&W, the optimization problem
is solved by binary search over the constant λ. By using
the gradient information from perceptual color difference,
the perturbation updating is translated into the perceptually
uniform color space. Large RGB perturbations, which have
a strong adversarial effect, remain hidden from the human
eye, as will be shown in Section 5.
4.2. Perceptual color distance alternating loss
(PerC-AL)
Although, Eq. 9 enjoys a concise expression, the two-
term joint optimization of PerC-C&W faces difficulties in
practice. Adversarial training [27], for example, presents
challenges. The reason is that PerC-C&W requires time-
consuming binary search in order to find an optimal λ,
which normally varies substantially among different im-
ages [42]. To address the inefficiency, we propose PerC-AL,
which decouples the joint optimization by alternately up-
dating the perturbations with respect to either classification
loss or perceptual color difference. Our strategy is inspired
Algorithm 1 Alternating Classification Loss and Perceptual
Color Differences (PerC-AL)
Input:
x: original image, t: target label, K: number of iterations
αl: step size in minimizing classification loss
αc: step size in minimizing perceptual color difference
Output: x′: adversarial image
1: Initialize x′0 ← x, δ0 ← 0
2: for k ← 1 to K do
3: if x′k−1 is not adversarial then
4: g ← −∇xJ(x′k−1, t)
5: g ← αl · g‖g‖2
6: δk ← δk−1 + g . Update δ in the direc-
tion of g
7: else
8: C2 ← −‖∆E00(x,x′k−1)‖2
9: gc ← ∇xC2
10: gc ← αc · gc‖gc‖2
11: δk ← δk−1 + gc . Update δ in the di-
rection of gc
12: end if
13: x′k ← clip(x+ δk, 0, 1)
14: x′k ← quantize(x′k) . Ensure x′k is valid
15: end for
16: return x′ ← x′k that is adversarial and has smallest C2
by DDN, which is basically a projected gradient descent
(PGD) method with a dynamic L2-norm bound. However,
PerC-AL goes beyond this idea to alternate two gradient de-
scents.
The full PerC-AL method is described in Algorithm 1.
We start from an original image x with the perturbation δ
initialized as 0, and iteratively update it to create an ad-
versarial image. In each iteration, the perturbation is ei-
ther enlarged to achieve stronger adversarial effect based on
the gradients from the classification loss, or shrunk to min-
imize perceptual color differences. These two operations
are alternated based on whether the intermediate perturbed
image x′k is adversarial or not. To ensure the final adversar-
ial image is valid, the output is clipped into the range [0,1]
and quantized into 255 levels (corresponding to 8-bit image
encoding).
5. Experiments
In this section, we first provide a picture of the differ-
ences between RGB and PerC approaches (Section 5.2).
Then, we carry out experiments that compare different ap-
proaches in terms of robustness (Section 5.3) and trans-
ferability (Section 5.4), by considering the case of high-
confidence adversarial examples. Finally, in Section 5.5,
we show that structural information can be elegantly inte-
grated into our efficient decoupled approach, PerC-AL, for
further improvement in the imperceptibility of images that
contain areas with rich visual variation.
5.1. Experimental setup
Dataset and Networks. Following recent work [53, 56,
12], we conduct our experiments on the development set
(1000 RGB natural images with the size of 299 × 299) of
the ImageNet-Compatible dataset2. This dataset was intro-
duced by the NIPS 2017 Competition on Adversarial At-
tacks and Defenses [28] and consists of 6000 images la-
beled with 1000 ImageNet classes. We choose this dataset
because we would like to study imperceptibility under real-
world conditions. In contrast, some other work [35, 10] on
addressing imperceptibility mainly focuses on the tiny im-
ages from MNIST [30] and CIFAR-10 [26]. As in the com-
petition, the Inception V3 [46] model pre-trained on Ima-
geNet is used as the target classifier.
Baselines. Three well-known baselines, namely, I-
FGSM [27], C&W [6], and the state-of-the-art DDN [42],
are compared with our approaches. Among them, I-FGSM
targets minimum L∞ norm, while C&W and DDN target
minimum L2 norm.
Parameters. I-FGSM is repeated multiple times with in-
creased L∞-norm bound by step size α = 1/255 for each
time until success.
C&W and PerC-C&W use Adam optimizer [25] with a
learning rate of 0.01 for updating the perturbations. We im-
pose a budget on the number of search steps used to find the
optimal λ. The initialization of λ is particularly important
for small budgets. We perform grid search for the initializa-
tion value of λ over the range [0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100], and
adopt the value that yields the smallest average perturba-
tion size. The selected initialization values are given in the
supplementary material.
For DDN and PerC-AL, we decrease the step size (α in
DDN and αl in PerC-AL) that is used for updating the per-
turbations with respect to the classification loss from 1 to
0.01 with cosine annealing. The L2-norm constraint  in
DDN is initialized to 1 and adjusted iteratively by γ = 0.05,
as in the original work DDN [42]. The αc in PerC-AL is
gradually reduced from 0.5 to 0.05 with cosine annealing.
Evaluation Protocol. We investigate a set of reasonable
operating points, based on pre-defined budgets. Note that
our goal is to show the relative behavior of PerC vs. RGB
approaches. For this purpose, we only need to create a fair
comparison, and it is not necessary to drive all approaches
to an absolute optimum. For each image, an approach is
considered successful if the perturbed image can achieve
adversarial effect with the given budget. Specifically, I-
2https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/tree/master/examples/
nips17 adversarial competition/dataset.
Approach Budget Success Perturbation Size
Rate (%) L2 L∞ C2
I-FGSM [27] - 100.0 2.51 1.59 317.96
C&W [6]
3×100 100.0 1.32 8.84 159.85
5×200 100.0 1.09 8.20 132.86
9×1000 100.0 0.92 8.45 114.36
PerC-C&W (ours)
3×100 100.0 2.77 14.29 150.44
5×200 100.0 1.48 12.06 83.93
9×1000 100.0 1.22 15.57 67.79
DDN [42]
100 100.0 1.00 7.84 136.11
300 100.0 0.88 7.58 120.12
1000 100.0 0.82 7.62 111.65
PerC-AL (ours)
100 100.0 1.30 11.98 69.49
300 100.0 1.17 13.97 61.21
1000 100.0 1.13 17.04 57.10
Table 1: Success rates and perturbation sizes on the 1000
images from the ImageNet-Compatible dataset, with varied
budgets in the targeted setting. Perturbation size is quan-
tified in terms of L2 and L∞ norms of the perturbations
in RGB space (L2 and L∞) and also in terms of image-
level accumulated perceptual color difference (C2). Note
that C&W and PerC-C&W actually need more (here, 5×)
iterations to find the optimal initialization of λ. The budget
for I-FGSM varies on different images.
FGSM requires varied repetitions for different images. For
C&W and PerC-C&W, the budget refers to N(search steps)
× N(iterations of gradient descent). We apply relatively
high budget (9 × 1000), and are also interested in lower
budgets (5×200 and 3×100), which are more directly com-
parable with more efficient approaches, namely, DDN and
PerC-AL. We test DDN and our PerC-AL with three differ-
ent iteration budgets (100, 300 and 1000), adopted from the
original work [42].
Adversarial strength is evaluated by the success rate, i.e.,
the proportion of successful cases over the whole dataset.
The averaged perturbation size over all successful images is
reported. It is measured in terms of the L2 and L∞ norm in
RGB space (L2 and L∞) and also in terms of image-level
accumulated perceptual color difference (C2).
5.2. Adversarial strength and imperceptibility
In this section, we investigate the adversarial strength
and imperceptibility of the perturbed images by different
approaches in a white-box scenario, where the full informa-
tion of the network is accessible.
5.2.1 Sufficient-confidence adversarial examples
We first present, in Table 1, a comparison demonstrating
how PerC approaches relax Lp norms. Our comparison
uses adversarial examples created under a commonly used
Approach κ = 20 κ = 40
Suc. (%) C2 Suc. (%) C2
I-FGSM [27] 100.0 375.74 99.9 576.06
C&W [6] 100.0 159.00 100.0 241.92
DDN [42] 100.0 150.68 98.1 238.37
PerC-C&W (ours) 100.0 90.86 100.0 136.22
PerC-AL (ours) 100.0 75.43 100.0 115.17
Table 2: Evaluation of the success rate and perceptual color
difference achieved by different approaches on the high-
confidence condition.
condition where the aim is to achieve a just sufficient ad-
versarial effect. Sufficient-confidence adversarial examples
just cross the decision boundary without pursuing a higher
confidence score for the adversarial label. As expected, all
approaches achieve 100% success rate and the resulting per-
turbation size gets smaller as the budget increases.
Table 1 confirms that PerC approaches, PerC-C&W and
PerC-AL, show the behavior they are designed for, i.e., de-
creasing the average accumulated perceptual color differ-
ence C2. More importantly, PerC approaches do this with-
out tightly constraining the Lp norms in RGB space as the
other approaches do, as reflected by L2 and L∞. More-
over, PerC-AL achieves lower C2 than PerC-C&W (57.10
vs. 67.79) with notably fewer iterations. For comparison,
we provide C2 for the RGB approaches. The untargeted
results follow a similar pattern and can be found in the sup-
plementary material.
5.2.2 High-confidence adversarial examples
In order to gain deeper insight into the performance of our
approaches, we investigate adversarial examples that have
a high confidence score for the adversarial label. High
confidence was initially investigated by [6] in order to
achieve more transferable adversarial examples, and also
been explored in the “Unrestricted Adversarial Example”
contest [5]. An approach is regarded as successful only if
the logit with respect to the original class becomes lower
than the maximum of the other logits by a pre-defined mar-
gin κ. For C&W and our PerC-C&W, this requirement
can be directly implemented by specifying the factor κ in
Eq. (4). For I-FGSM, DDN and PerC-AL, this can be
achieved by running the iterations until the required logit
difference is satisfied. For this experiment, we adopt the
settings generating the smallest perturbations for each ap-
proach in Section 5.2.1.
Fig. 3 shows some adversarial examples generated by
different approaches at κ = 40. The images produced by
our PerC approaches look more visually acceptable than
those of the other approaches. More examples can be found
Figure 3: Examples of adversarial images generated by five different approaches with high confidence level κ = 40
Figure 4: Evaluation of robustness of high-confidence ad-
versarial examples at (a) κ = 20 and (b) κ = 40, against
two types of image transformations: JPEG compression
(top row) and bit-depth reduction (bottom row).
in our GitHub repository3. The good visual appearance of
the PerC examples is consistent with their low averaged ag-
gregated perceptual color difference, C2, as seen in Table 2,
which shows both κ = 40 and κ = 20 values. The chal-
lenge of the high-confidence setting is seen in the success
rates, which are not longer perfect for all conditions.
5.3. Robustness
In order to gain additional practical insight, we test the
robustness of the adversarial examples against two com-
3https://github.com/ZhengyuZhao/PerC-Adversarial.
monly studied image transformation-based defense meth-
ods, i.e., JPEG compression [13, 19, 11, 12] and bit-depth
reduction [54, 19, 21].
The results are shown in Fig. 4. Overall, increasing κ
from 20 to 40 leads to improved robustness. For a specific κ,
unsurprisingly, I-FGSM outperforms other approaches by a
large margin since it greedily perturbs all the pixels, but at
the cost of worse image quality (see Fig. 3). Among the
other four approaches that target minimal image-level ac-
cumulated image difference with very sparse perturbations,
the best results are consistently achieved by either our PerC-
C&W or PerC-AL. Specifically, PerC-C&W outperforms
the original C&W in all cases, while PerC-AL consistently
outperforms DDN. Recall that our PerC approaches cause
fewer visual distortions, as shown in Fig. 3, contributing to
imperceptibility.
5.4. Transferability
Existing research [49, 33] has demonstrated that the ad-
versarial effect of some examples optimized for a specific
network may transfer to another network. We test the
transferability of different approaches from the original In-
ception V3 to other three pre-trained networks, namely,
GoogLeNet [46], ResNet-152 [20], and VGG-16 [45].
Specifically, an untargeted adversarial example generated
for the original model is regarded to be transferable to a new
model if it can also induce misclassification of that model.
It is less meaningful to analyze the adversarial perturba-
tions in the case that an original image, without any added
perturbations, has already yielded a different prediction by
a new model. So we only consider the images that yield the
same original predictions for all the four studied networks.
The success rates under transferability for different ap-
proaches on all the eligible images (494 in total) are re-
ported in Table 3. I-FGSM again outperforms the other
GoogLeNet VGG-16 ResNet-152
κ = 20 κ = 40 κ = 20 κ = 40 κ = 20 κ = 40
I-FGSM [27] 3.4 5.3 6.5 11.9 7.5 9.9
C&W [6] 1.8 2.8 3.9 5.9 4.5 5.1
DDN [42] 1.0 2.0 4.5 6.7 4.3 5.1
PerC-C&W (ours) 2.2 3.9 4.3 8.1 5.5 6.5
PerC-AL (ours) 1.6 3.4 5.1 7.9 5.3 7.3
Table 3: Success rates of adversarial examples at two high
confidence levels κ = 20 and κ = 40, achieved by different
approaches under transferability from the original Inception
V3 to three other networks.
approaches, but uses excessive perturbations. Among the
other approaches, we can observe that the best results are
always achieved by one of our two PerC approaches.
5.5. Assembling structural information
We explore the possibility of assembling structural in-
formation for further improving imperceptibility without
impacting the adversarial strength. Specifically, we intro-
duce a texture complexity matrix σ as a weighting term
into our efficient PerC-AL framework. Following existing
work [35, 10] on addressing imperceptibility with respect to
image structures, this matrix is obtained based on the stan-
dard deviation of the values in the neighbourhood (here 3×3
square) of each image coordinate. The components with top
5% highest values in the map are clipped for stability and
the map is normalized into the range [0,1] before use.
Concretely, this approach adjusts step 8 in Algorithm 1
to:
C2 ← −‖(1− σ) ·∆E00(x,x′k−1)‖2, (10)
where the C2 becomes also sensitive to image differences
in terms of local visual variation. As shown in Fig. 5, with
the help of additional structural information, perturbations
in the smooth regions are suppressed, while more changes,
which are hardly perceived, are triggered in the area with
rich visual variation. It is worthwhile for the future work to
investigate the effectiveness of this combined approach in
more detail.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
This paper has demonstrated the usefulness of perceptual
color distance for creating large but imperceptible adversar-
ial image perturbations. We have proposed two approaches
to creating adversarial images, PerC-C&W and PerC-AL.
Our experimental investigation of these approaches shows
that perceptual color distance is able to improve impercepti-
bility, especially in smooth, saturated regions. We show that
these approaches have perturbations with larger RGB Lp
norms than approaches that perturb directly in RGB space.
This effect translates into adversarial strength, i.e., the abil-
ity of the perturbations to fool a classifier.
Figure 5: Adversarial examples at κ = 40 of an image
that contains both smooth and textured regions, generated
by PerC-AL (top) and PerC-AL plus structure (bottom).
Our work has made a contribution to recent work that
seeks to create adversarial images that are imperceptible to
the eye of the human observer. This work has been carried
out in the area of security [6, 15, 18, 27, 41] (defend infer-
ence of a legitimate classifier) and privacy [38, 40, 8, 34]
(prevent inference of an illegitimate classifier). In the se-
curity area, imperceptible perturbations can mean that ad-
versarial images can poison the training data without being
noticed by human annotators. In the privacy area, imper-
ceptible perturbations mean wider acceptance of the use of
adversarial images to protect against classification attacks.
In the future, we will continue to consider perceptual
color in adversarial images from both the privacy and the
security angle. Our first direction will be related to the
fact that neither conventional RGB perturbations nor PerC
perturbations perform well in smooth regions with low sat-
uration. We would like to develop techniques that can
make perturbations imperceptible, or unnecessary, in such
regions. Our second direction will be related to robust-
ness. Here, we have looked at robustness as it is conven-
tionally studied in the literature on adversarial image exam-
ples. However, since PerC-based approaches used percep-
tual color distance, it could be possible to mitigate PerC-
based perturbations by limiting bit depth in perceptual color
space. With regard to this possibility, we point out that in
order to counteract the effect of PerC perturbations in this
way, it is necessary to be able to infer that they have been
applied to an image. For this reason, our future work will
also investigate ways to detect that an image contains PerC
perturbations, and new varieties of PerC perturbations that
minimize the effectiveness of such detection.
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Supplementary Material
Approach Budget λTargeted Untargeted
C&W [6]
3×100 1 0.1
5×200 1 1
9×1000 1 1
PerC-C&W (ours)
3×100 10 100
5×200 10 100
9×1000 10 10
Table 4: Selected initializations of λ via grid search.
Approach Budget Success Perturbation Size
Rate (%) L2 L∞ C2
I-FGSM [27] - 100.0 1.94 1.02 255.92
C&W [6]
3×100 100.0 0.69 3.61 88.76
5×200 100.0 0.45 3.79 59.88
9×1000 100.0 0.41 3.74 54.17
PerC-C&W (ours)
3×100 100.0 1.47 6.78 78.25
5×200 100.0 0.90 6.71 51.35
9×1000 100.0 0.56 6.58 33.00
DDN [42]
100 100.0 0.35 4.03 49.43
300 100.0 0.33 4.08 47.58
1000 100.0 0.32 4.11 46.51
PerC-AL (ours)
100 100.0 0.53 5.58 30.39
300 100.0 0.50 6.93 27.65
1000 100.0 0.51 8.92 26.62
Table 5: Success rates and perturbation sizes on the 1000
images from the ImageNet-Compatible dataset, with varied
budgets in the targeted setting. Perturbation size is quan-
tified in terms of L2 and L∞ norms of the perturbations
in RGB space (L2 and L∞) and also in terms of image-
level accumulated perceptual color difference ( C2). For
this relatively easy untargeted case, PerC-AL is initialized
with αc = 0.1.
